A flexible labor margin allows households to absorb shocks to asset values with changes in hours worked as well as changes in consumption. This ability to absorb shocks along both margins can greatly alter the household's attitudes toward risk, as shown in Swanson (2012) . The present paper analyzes how frictional labor markets affect that analysis. Risk aversion is higher: 1) in recessions, 2) in countries with more frictional labor markets, and 3) for households that have more difficulty finding a job. These predictions are consistent with empirical evidence from a variety of sources. Traditional, fixed-labor measures of risk aversion show no stable relationship to the equity premium in a standard real business cycle model with search frictions, while the closed-form expressions derived in the present paper match the equity premium closely.
Introduction
A number of recent studies have brought standard dynamic macroeconomic models into closer agreement with basic asset pricing facts, such as the equity premium or long-term bond premium.
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In these models-indeed, in any consumption-based asset-pricing model-a crucial parameter is risk aversion, the compensation that households require to hold a risky asset. At the same time, a key feature of standard dynamic macroeconomic models is that households have some ability to vary their labor supply. A fundamental difficulty with this line of research, then, is that much of what is known about risk aversion has been derived under the assumption that household labor is fixed. For example, Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1965) define absolute and relative risk aversion, −u (c)/u (c) and −c u (c)/u (c), in a static model with one consumption good. Similarly, Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) define risk aversion for generalized recursive preferences in a dynamic model without labor (or, equivalently, in which labor is fixed). Swanson (2012) considers this problem when households have standard expected utility preferences in a dynamic equilibrium model with frictionless markets. That paper derives closedform expressions for risk aversion and shows that risk aversion-and risk premia on assets in the model-can vary dramatically depending on how the household's labor margin is specified.
Intuitively, a flexible labor margin gives households the ability to absorb shocks to asset values with changes in hours worked as well as changes in consumption. This ability to absorb shocks along either or both margins can greatly alter the household's attitudes toward risk. For example, with period utility u(c t , l t ) = c 1−γ t /(1 − γ) − ηl t , the quantity −c u 11 /u 1 = γ is often referred to as the household's coefficient of relative risk aversion, but in fact the household is risk neutral with respect to gambles over asset values or wealth (Swanson, 2012) . Intuitively, the household is indifferent at the margin between using labor or consumption to absorb a shock to asset values, and the household in this example is clearly risk neutral with respect to gambles over hours. More The present paper analyzes how those results are affected when labor markets are frictional, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Shimer (2005 Shimer ( , 2010 . In that case, risk aversion lies 1 See, for example, Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) , Tallarini (2000) , Swanson (2008, 2012) , Uhlig (2007) , Van Binsbergen et al. (2012) , Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2008) , Gourio (2012 Gourio ( , 2013 , Palomino (2012) , Andreasen (2012 Andreasen ( , 2013 , Colacito and Croce (2012) , Dew-Becker (2012) , and Kung (2012) , which all consider asset pricing in dynamic macroeconomic models with a variable labor margin.
somewhere between the fixed-and flexible-labor cases-between γ and (γ −1 + χ −1 ) −1 in the example above. The present paper derives the corresponding closed-form expressions for risk aversion with frictional labor markets and shows that those expressions depend on the ratio of labor market flow rates to the household's discount rate. Intuitively, labor market frictions only delay, and do not prevent, the household's labor adjustment; thus, a lower discount rate implies that frictions are less of a concern to the household because this delay is less costly.
The closed-form expressions for risk aversion derived in the present paper have three main implications: First, risk aversion is higher in recessions, when unemployment is higher. Second, risk aversion is greater in more frictional labor markets, such as those in Continental Europe.
And third, risk aversion is higher for households that are less employable, such as retirees, less educated households, and households that face labor market discrimination. In all of these cases, it is more difficult for the household to vary its employment in response to shocks, and so more of the burden of asset fluctuations must pass through to consumption.
These predictions of the model are supported by several empirical observations. First, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) cite many studies that find risk premia are higher in recessions.
2 Second, Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2002) and Ynesta (2008) show that the portfolio holdings of European households are substantially more conservative than those of U.S. households. Third, in all of these countries the portfolios of households near retirement are more conservative than those of younger households ).
More generally, there is substantial evidence that households vary their labor supply in response to financial shocks (i.e., that the wealth effect is negative). Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001) find that households who win a prize in the lottery reduce their labor supply significantly; Coile and Levine (2009) document that older workers are less likely to retire after the stock market performs poorly; and Coronado and Perozek (2003) find that households retire earlier when the stock market performs well. Pencavel (1986) surveys estimates of the wealth effect on labor supply in general and finds it to be significantly negative.
The mechanism introduced in the present paper is a novel and promising one for generating risk aversion and risk premia that vary over the business cycle, across countries, and across households as described above. However, the stylized model of the present paper requires a high discount rate-about 10 to 15 percent per year-for the effects of labor market frictions on risk aversion to be quantitatively important. As mentioned earlier, labor market frictions only delay, rather than prevent, households' labor adjustment, and the cost of this delay to the household is closely related to the discount rate. Thus, other costs of delayed labor adjustment, such as liquidity constraints or borrowing constraints, would have to be incorporated into the model to make it consistent with both low household discount rates and substantial variation in risk aversion across countries or over time. Alternatively, high discount rates could be justified using generalized recursive preferences, as in Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) , which cause households to discount future bad states of the world more heavily.
There are a few previous studies that extend the Arrow-Pratt definition beyond the onegood, one-period case. Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) provide an early example of the difficulties involved. In a static, multiple-good setting, Stiglitz (1969) measures risk aversion using the household's indirect utility function rather than utility itself, essentially a special case of Proposition 1 of the present paper. Constantinides (1990) measures risk aversion in a dynamic endowment economy (i.e., with fixed labor) using the household's value function, another special case of Proposition 1. Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (1997) apply Constantinides' definition to some very simple endowment economy models for which they can compute closed-form expressions for the value function, and hence risk aversion. The present paper builds on these studies by deriving closed-form solutions for risk aversion in dynamic equilibrium models in general, demonstrating the importance of the labor margin, and showing how labor market frictions affect those results.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines a general dynamic equilibrium framework with labor market frictions. Section 3 derives closed-form expressions for risk aversion in that framework and presents a numerical example showing the importance of taking the labor margin into account. Section 4 derives the implications of labor market frictions for risk aversion described above. The quantitative importance of these results is explored in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes. An Appendix provides details of the model, proofs, and numerical solution methods that are outlined in the main text.
Dynamic Equilibrium Framework with Labor Market Frictions

The Household's Optimization Problem and Value Function
Time is discrete and continues forever. At each time t, the household seeks to maximize the expected present discounted value of utility flows,
where E t denotes the mathematical expectation conditional on the household's information set at time t, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and c τ , l τ , and u τ denote the household's state-contingent plans for future consumption, labor, and unemployment at time τ . The explicit state-dependence of these plans is suppressed to reduce notation. A detailed microfoundation for the household's preferences in (1) is tangential to the present discussion, but is provided in the Appendix. Briefly, the household consists of a unit continuum of individuals who pool their income. At each time t, an individual who is not employed can either search for a job or stay home and produce nonmarket goods and services (including "leisure").
The household's home production function is increasing and concave in the number of individuals staying at home; as a result, V in (1) is increasing and convex in the number of workers not at home, l t + u t .
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The labor market is characterized by search and matching. Household labor l t is a state variable rather than a choice variable, evolving according to
where s ∈ [0, 1] denotes a constant exogenous rate of job destruction, θ t is a Markovian state vector that is exogenous to the household and characterizes the state of the aggregate economy at time t, and f is a function of the aggregate state that gives the measure of jobs found per unit of household unemployment.
In each period t, the household chooses c t and u t (and a state-contingent plan for future c τ and u τ ) to maximize (1), subject to the labor market friction (2), the flow budget constraint
3 The labor market search literature often assumes that household leisure or home production is linear in the number of workers staying at home (e.g., Shimer, 2010) . Assumption 1 requires strict convexity of V in order to guarantee the uniqueness of the household's optimal choice of (c t , u t ) at each time t, discussed below. Intuitively, the case of a linear V can be approximated with a V having infinitesimal convexity.
and the no-Ponzi-scheme condition
where a t denotes the household's beginning-of-period assets and w t , r t , and d t denote the real wage, interest rate, and net transfer payments to the household in each period t, respectively. In addition to Assumption 1, a few more technical conditions are required to ensure the value function for the household's optimization problem exists and satisfies the Bellman equation (Stokey and Lucas (1990) , Alvarez and Stokey (1998) , and Rincón-Zapatera and Rodríguez-Palmero (2003) give different sets of such sufficient conditions). The details of these conditions are tangential to the present paper, so it is simply assumed that:
Assumption 2. The value function V : X → R for the household's optimization problem exists and satisfies the Bellman equation
where l t+1 is given by equation (2), and a t+1 by equation (3). 
where a
Representative Household and Steady State Assumptions
Up to this point, the analysis has focused on a single household in isolation, leaving the other households of the model and the production side of the economy unspecified. Implicitly, the other households and production sector jointly determine the process for θ t (and hence w t , r t , and d t ), and much of the analysis below does not need to be any more specific about these processes than this. However, to move from general expressions for risk aversion to more concrete, closed-form expressions, three standard assumptions from the macroeconomics literature are adopted:
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Assumption 5. The household is infinitesimal.
Assumption 6. The household is representative.
Assumption 7. The model has a nonstochastic steady state, at which . . . , and x ∈ {c, u, l, a, w, r, d, θ}. Assumption 5 implies that an individual household's choices for c t and u t have no effect on the aggregate quantities w t , r t , d t , and θ t . Assumption 6 implies that, when the economy is at the nonstochastic steady state, any individual household finds it optimal to choose the steady-state values of c and u given a and θ. Throughout the text, a variable without a time subscript t is used to denote its steady-state value.
5
4 Alternative assumptions about the nature of the other households in the model or the production sector may also allow for closed-form expressions for risk aversion. However, the assumptions used here are standard and thus the most natural to pursue. 5 Let the exogenous state θ t contain the variances of any shocks to the model, so that (a, l; θ) denotes the nonstochastic steady state, with the variances of any shocks (other than the hypothetical gamble described in the next section) set equal to zero; c (a, l; θ) corresponds to the household's optimal consumption choice at the nonstochastic steady state, etc.
It is important to note that Assumptions 6-7 do not prohibit offering an individual household a hypothetical gamble of the type described below. 
Risk Aversion
The Coefficient of Absolute Risk Aversion
The household's attitudes toward risk at time t generally depend on the household's state vector at time t, (a t , l t ; θ t ). Given this state, the household's aversion to a hypothetical one-shot gamble in period t of the form
can be considered, where ε t+1 is a random variable representing the gamble, with bounded support [ε, ε] , mean zero, unit variance, independent of θ τ for all times τ , and independent of a τ , l τ , c τ , and u τ for all τ ≤ t. A few words about (7) are in order: First, the gamble is dated t + 1 to clarify that its outcome is not in the household's information set at time t. Second, c t cannot be made the subject of the gamble without substantial modifications to the household's optimization problem, because c t is a choice variable under control of the household at time t. However, (7) is clearly equivalent to a one-shot gamble over net transfers d t or asset returns r t , both of which are exogenous to the household. Indeed, thinking of the gamble as being over r t helps to illuminate the connection between (7) and the price of risky assets, which will be discussed further in Section 4.
As shown there, the household's aversion to the gamble in (7) is directly linked to the premium households require to hold risky assets.
Following Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1965) , one can ask what one-time fee μ the household would be willing to pay in period t to avoid the gamble in (7):
The quantity μ that makes the household just indifferent between (7) and (8) 
In Definition 1, μ(a t , l t ; θ t ; σ) denotes the household's "willingness to pay" to avoid a one-shot gamble of size σ in (7). As in Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1965) 
where V 1 and V 11 denote the first and second partial derivatives of V with respect to its first argument. Given (9) can be evaluated at the steady state to yield
Proof: See Appendix.
Equations (9)-(10) are essentially Constantinides ' (1990) definition of risk aversion, and have obvious similarities to Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1965) . Here, of course, it is the curvature 6 Discussion of relative risk aversion is deferred until the next subsection because defining total household wealth is complicated by the presence of human capital-that is, the household's labor income. 7 See, e.g., Constantinides (1990) , Farmer (1990) , Campbell and Cochrane (1999) , and Flavin and Nakagawa (2008) . For the more general case of Epstein-Zin (1990) preferences, equation (9) no longer holds and there is no folk wisdom; see Swanson (2013) for the more general expressions corresponding to that case.
of the value function V with respect to assets that matters, rather than the curvature of U with respect to consumption.
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A practical difficulty with Proposition 1 is that closed-form expressions for the value function V do not exist in general, even for the simplest dynamic models with labor. One can solve this problem by observing that V 1 and V 11 often can be computed even when closed-form solutions for V cannot be. For example, the Benveniste-Scheinkman equation,
states that the marginal value of a dollar of assets equals the marginal utility of consumption times 1 + r t (the interest rate appears here because beginning-of-period assets in the model generate income in period t). In (11), U is a known function. Although a closed-form solution for the function c * is not known in general, the point c * t often is known-for example, when it is evaluated at the nonstochastic steady state, c. Thus, one can compute V 1 at the nonstochastic steady state by evaluating the right-hand side of (11) at that point.
The second derivative V 11 can be computed by noting that equation (11) holds for general a t ; hence it can be differentiated to yield
All that remains is to find the derivative ∂c * t /∂a t . Intuitively, ∂c * t /∂a t should not be too difficult to compute: it is just the household's marginal propensity to consume today out of a change in assets, which can be deduced from the household's Euler equation and budget constraint. Differentiating the Euler equation
with respect to a t yields
8 Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1965) occasionally refer to utility as being defined over "money", so one could argue that they always intended for risk aversion to be measured using indirect utility or the value function. 
In other words, starting from steady state, whatever the change in the household's optimal consumption today, it must be the same as the change in the household's optimal consumption tomorrow, and the change in the household's optimal consumption at each future date t + k.
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The household's budget constraint is implied by asset accumulation equation (3) and the no-Ponzi condition (4). Differentiating (3) with respect to a t , evaluating at steady state, and
applying (4) gives
In other words, the present discounted value of the change in consumption equals the change in assets plus the present discounted value of the change in labor income.
To solve for ∂c t /∂a t using equations (15)- (16), it only remains to solve for ∂l * t+k /∂a t . This is done in two steps, using the household's Euler equation for unemployment and the transition equation (2) for labor. The details of this computation are tangential to the main points of this section, so the result is summarized in the following lemma: Lemma 1. Given Assumptions 1-7, the household's expected marginal propensity to work at each future date t + k, k = 1, 2, . . ., with respect to changes in assets at time t, evaluated at steady state, satisfies ∂l * t+k
where γ ≡ −cU (c)/U (c) denotes the elasticity of U with respect to c, evaluated at steady state, and
the elasticity of V with respect to l + u, at steady state.
Note that, in response to a change in assets, household consumption moves instantly to a new steady-state level, but l responds only gradually, approaching its new steady-state level asymptotically as k → ∞.
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10 Note that this equality does not follow from the steady state assumption. For example, in a model with internal habits, considered in Swanson (2009) , the individual household's optimal consumption response to a change in assets increases with time, even starting from steady state.
11 Even for the case of balanced growth (γ = 1), ∂l * t+k /∂a t < 0 because equation (17) represents a wealth effect with no offsetting substitution effect from higher wages.
Substituting (17) 
In response to a unit increase in assets, the household raises consumption in every period by the extra asset income, r (the "golden rule"), adjusted downward by 1 + w γ χ
which takes into account the household's decrease in hours worked and labor income. Thus, equation (18) represents a "modified golden rule" that accounts for variation in the household's labor supply. When f (θ) is large relative to r, (18) converges to the modified golden rule derived in Swanson (2012) for a frictionless labor market. Alternatively, when f (θ) = 0, labor is exogenously fixed and (18) equals r, the traditional golden rule.
The household's coefficient of absolute risk aversion can now be written in terms of known quantities. Substituting (11), (12), and (18) into (10) 
There are several features of Proposition 2 worth noting. If labor supply is exogenously fixed, corresponding to s = f (θ) = 0, then risk aversion in (19) reduces to −rU /U , the usual Arrow-Pratt definition multiplied by a scale factor r, which translates assets into units of currentperiod consumption. 12 More generally, when f (θ) > 0, households can partially offset shocks to asset values through changes in hours worked. Note that even though consumption and labor are additively separable in (1), the household's consumption process is still connected to the labor market through the budget constraint. As a result, the household's aversion to a gamble over assets is related to its ability to offset asset fluctuations by varying hours of work.
A flexible labor margin implies that risk aversion is less than in the fixed-labor case:
If r < 1, then (18) is also less than −U /U .
12 A gamble over a lump sum of $X is equivalent here to a gamble over an annuity of $X/r. Thus, even though V 11 /V 1 is different from U /U by a factor of r, this difference is exactly the same as a change from lump-sum to annuity units. Thus, the difference in scale is essentially one of units. See Swanson (2012) .
Note that, since r is the net interest rate, r 1 in typical calibrations.
The relationship between labor market flexibility, risk aversion, and risk premia is considered below, after first defining relative risk aversion.
The Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion
The distinction between absolute and relative risk aversion lies in the size of the hypothetical gamble faced by the household. If the household faces a one-shot gamble of size A t in period t,
or the household can pay a one-time fee A t μ in period t to avoid this gamble, then it follows from Proposition 1 that lim σ→0 2μ(σ)/σ 2 for this gamble is given by
The natural definition of A t , considered by Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1965) , is the household's wealth at time t. The gamble in (21) is then over a fraction of the household's wealth and (22) is referred to as the household's coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In models with labor, however, household wealth can be more difficult to define because of the presence of human capital.
13 Swanson (2012 Swanson ( , 2013 discusses the issue of human capital and household wealth in more detail, but the details of this discussion are tangential to the present paper, so human capital here is simply defined to be the present discounted value of labor earnings. 14 Equivalently, from the budget constraint (3)- (4), household wealth equals the present discounted value of consumption.
The factor (1+r t ) −1 in the definition expresses wealth A t in beginning-rather than end-of-period-t units, so that in steady state A = c/r and relative risk aversion is given by
13 Note that the household's financial assets a t are not a good measure of wealth A t , since a t for an individual household may be zero or negative at some points in time.
14 Swanson (2013) shows that this measure of wealth and risk aversion seems to be more closely related to risk premia in standard macroeconomic models than if the value of leisure is included in human capital.
where (23) makes use of the definition γ = −cU (c)/U (c). Note that if labor is exogenously fixed, so that s = f (θ) = 0, equation (23) reduces to the usual Arrow-Pratt definition. But as long as the household has some ability to vary its hours of work, risk aversion is reduced by the factor in the denominator of (23).
Numerical Example
The relationship between the labor margin, risk aversion, and risk premia can be seen in a simple real business cycle model with labor market frictions.
15 Let the economy consist of a unit continuum of representative households, each with optimization problem (1)- (4) and period utility function
There is a unit continuum of perfectly competitive firms, each with production function
where y t , l t , and k t denote firm output, labor, and beginning-of-period capital, respectively, and Z t denotes an exogenous aggregate productivity process that follows
The innovations ε t in (26) 
where r t = r k t − δ and δ denotes the capital depreciation rate. Firms hire labor by posting vacancies v t at a cost of κ per vacancy per period. The number of workers employed by each firm evolves according to
where l t denotes the number of workers per firm and h t the number of new hires.
16 New hires are determined by the Cobb-Douglas matching function,
This implies the job-finding rate for households is
At the beginning of each period t, workers and firms who were matched in the previous period bargain over the wage w t . If negotiations break down, the worker and firm each can search for a new match in period t. Let J t denote the representative firm's surplus from hiring an additional worker in period t:
The firm's surplus is the difference between the marginal product of labor and the wage this period, plus the expected discounted value of the firm surplus next period, if the match persists.
Let S t denote the representative household's marginal surplus from employment,
The household's surplus, relative to being unemployed, is the wage plus the expected discounted value of the surplus next period, if the match persists. (For simplicity, assume there is no compensation for being unemployed; also note that the household incurs marginal disutility V (l t + u t ) whether the individual works or is unemployed.)
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The wage w t in each period is set by Nash bargaining, so that
16 Note that l t in (28) denotes the number of workers employed by each firm as well as the number of household members who work; since both firms and households have unit measure, these two quantities are equal. 17 Some authors interpret the Cobb-Douglas matching function in (29) to be h t = max{μu
However, h t ≤ u t holds around the steady state in this example, so including this max operator does not affect numerical solutions local to the model's steady state.
18 Let V E t , V U t , and V H t denote the value to the household of an individual being employed, unemployed, and at home, respectively. Then The numerical example is calibrated to monthly data; χ 0 , κ, and μ are set to achieve steady-state values of l + u = 0.3, v/u = 0.6, and f (θ) = 0.28, respectively. Benchmark values for γ and χ are high in order to achieve a nontrivial equity premium, but a wide range for these parameter values is considered in Figure 1 , below. See text for details.
where ν ∈ [0, 1] denotes the household's Nash bargaining weight.
In equilibrium, the marginal cost and marginal benefit to the firm of hiring a worker are equal, so
Similarly, the marginal cost and benefit to the household of searching for a job are equal, giving the household's unemployment Euler equation (A14).
As discussed in Shimer (2010) , models with frictional labor markets are more naturally calibrated to monthly than to quarterly data, because unemployed workers in the U.S. typically find jobs in much less than one quarter. Benchmark values for the model's parameters are reported in Table 1 . The household's discount factor β is set to .996, as in Shimer (2010) , implying an annual real interest rate of about 5 percent. The utility curvature parameters with respect to consumption and labor, γ and χ, are each set to 200 in order to generate a nontrivial equity premium in the model, but much lower values for these parameters are also considered in Figure 1 , below. The utility parameter χ 0 governing the disutility of work is set to achieve a target value of l + u = 0.3 in steady state; that is, the houshold is assumed to devote about 30 percent of its time endowment to market work and labor market search.
Labor's share of output, α, is set to 0.7. The exogenous productivity process is given a monthly persistence ρ = 0.98 and a shock standard deviation of σ ε = .005, as in Shimer (2010) .
The capital depreciation rate δ is set to .0028, also following Shimer (2010) , and implying a steady-state capital/annual output ratio of 3.2.
Following Shimer (2010) , the exogenous job separation rate s is set to .02, wage bargaining is taken to be symmetric between workers and firms, corresponding to ν = 0.5, and the matching function elasticity η is set to 0.5. Firms' cost of posting a vacancy κ is set to achieve a target ratio v/u = 0.6 in steady state, consistent with the estimates in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) and Hall (2005) . The matching function productivity parameter μ is set to achieve a target of f (θ) = 0.28 in steady state, consistent with the estimate in Shimer (2012) .
An equity security in the model is defined to be a claim on the aggregate consumption stream, where aggregate consumption C t = c t in equilibrium. The ex-dividend price of the equity claim, p t , satisfies
in equilibrium, where m t+1 = βc γ t /c γ t+1 denotes the household's stochastic discount factor. The equity premium, ψ t , is defined to be the expected excess return
For any given set of parameter values, the model is solved numerically using perturbation methods, as in Swanson (2012) . with γ, but rather follows a concave trajectory that matches relative risk aversion R c closely. In the bottom panel, γ is constant at 200 while R c and the equity premium increases sharply with labor market rigidity (as the job-finding rate, f (θ), approaches zero).
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The numerical example in this section thus illustrates three main points. First, the traditional, fixed-labor measure of risk aversion has essentially no relationship to the price of risky assets when households can vary their labor supply. Second, relative risk aversion R c , defined in the present paper, is much more closely related to the equity premium. (There are good theoretical reasons to expect this to be the case; see the Appendix for a derivation of the relationship between the equity premium and risk aversion in the model.) And third, the difference between relative risk aversion R c and the fixed-labor measure of risk aversion can be very large, as in the top panel of Figure 1 , where relative risk aversion R c can be arbitrarily small as χ becomes small even while γ remains fixed at 200.
Implications of Labor Market Frictions for Risk Aversion
Intuitively, labor market frictions make it more difficult for households to insure themselves from asset fluctuations by varying hours of work. Thus, a greater degree of labor market frictions should imply higher risk aversion, all else equal. That effect is evident in the bottom panel of Figure 1 ; in the present section, the implications of labor market frictions for risk aversion are analyzed both more generally and in more detail.
The transition equation (2) for labor, evaluated at steady state, implies
Equation (37) can be used to substitute out f (θ)u/l in (23) to obtain
If labor is exogenously fixed, so that s = f (θ) = 0, equation (38) and κ also change to keep l + u = 0.3 and v/u = 0.6 in steady state (see Table 1 and its discussion). As a result, l and c in equation (23) both vanish as f (θ) → 0, so the limit of equation (23) is not γ.
to the formula for risk aversion derived by Swanson (2012) 
Risk Aversion Is Higher in Recessions
Intuitively, a recession is a period in which employment is low and unemployment is high, or l/u is low. The following proposition characterizes the relationship between l/u and risk aversion:
Proposition 3. Given Assumptions 1-8 and fixed values for the parameters s, β, γ, and χ, R c (a, l; θ) is decreasing in l/u.
Proof: Since 1 + r = 1/β, r is independent of l/u. Assumption 8 then implies R c (a, l; θ) in equation (39) is decreasing in l/u.
Proposition 3 shows that risk aversion is higher in recessions. A lower ratio of employment to unemployment implies that it is harder for unemployed workers to find a job, because f (θ) = sl/u.
As a result, it is more difficult for households to use the labor market to insure themselves from asset fluctuations.
Note that the source of the change in l/u in Proposition 3 is irrelevant. The ratio l/u could be lower because of a decrease in the efficiency of the matching function, a fall in firm productivity or government purchases, or a change in some other element of the economic state θ. Proposition 3 also holds regardless of how the production side of the economy is specified, so long as Assumptions 1-8 for the household's problem are satisfied. The details of the production function and matching technology will generally affect the stochastic process for θ t and the functional form of f , but do not affect the conclusions of the proposition.
Although l/u is the ratio of steady-state employment to unemployment, low l/u is the standard way to model a recession in labor search models. Gross flows in and out of employment and unemployment are large in the U.S., so calibrated labor search models imply that employment and unemployment converge very rapidly to their steady states, in a matter of weeks rather than quarters (e.g., Shimer, 2012, Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin, 2013) . Thus, the interpretation of low l/u in Proposition 3 as a recession is typical in the literature.
Finally, the model's prediction that risk aversion is countercyclical is interesting because
there is a great deal of empirical evidence that risk premia in financial markets are countercyclical (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane 1999 , Cochrane 1999 , Lettau and Ludvigson 2010 , Piazzesi and Swanson 2008 . Indeed, an important contribution of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) was to generate countercyclical risk aversion in an asset pricing model to better match the observed countercyclicality of risk premia in the data. Proposition 3 of the present paper shows that labor market frictions provide an additional or alternative source of countercyclical risk aversion.
Even without consumption habits, households' reduced ability to offset portfolio fluctuations in a recession makes them more risk averse and thus will tend to raise risk premia. The quantitative importance of this effect will be discussed below.
Risk Aversion Is Higher in More Frictional Labor Markets
Intuitively, labor market frictions are greater when f (θ) is lower-when it is harder for an unemployed worker to find a job. The following proposition characterizes the relationship between f (θ) and risk aversion: 
Proof: Since 1 + r = 1/β, r is independent of f (θ). Assumption 8 then implies R c (a, l; θ) in equation (38) is decreasing in f (θ).
Consistent with the intuition presented earlier, Proposition 4 shows that a more rigid labor market implies greater risk aversion. The case f (θ) = s = 0 corresponds to complete labor market rigidity and leads to the maximal level of household risk aversion, γ.
Proposition 4 is interesting because it suggests that economies with more frictional labor markets should also have higher risk premia. For example, if labor markets in Europe are characterized by lower job-finding probabilities f (θ) than in the U.S., then Propostion 4 implies risk aversion in those countries should be higher than in the U.S. The quantitative importance of this effect will be explored below.
As with Proposition 3, Proposition 4 holds regardless of the details of the production side of the economy. The production function and matching technology may affect the stochastic process for θ t and the functional form of f , but do not affect the conclusions of Proposition 4, so long as its conditions remain satisfied.
Finally, it might be tempting to conclude from (38) 
Proof: Since 1 + r = 1/β, r is independent of s and f . Assumption 8 then implies R c (a, l; θ) in equation (38) is increasing in s + f (θ).
Risk Aversion Is Higher for Households that Are Less Employable
Propositions 3-4 and Corollary 2 all assumed a representative household. That assumption is now relaxed to consider the case where the economy is populated by a unit continuum of households divided into two types: a set of measure one of households of type 1, and a set of measure zero of households of type 2. Obviously, the aggregate equilbrium of the economy is determined by the type 1 households, which can be thought of as "representative". Type 2 households are assumed to be the same as those of type 1 except that it is harder for them to find a job-that is, f 2 (θ) < f 1 (θ) at the steady-state θ. (The aggregate state variable θ is the same for both household types.)
Given that the aggregate equilibrium is determined by the type 1 households, it is straightforward to check that Propositions 1-4 continue to hold in this economy for both type 1 and type 2 households. In particular, Propositions 1 and 2 give the expressions for risk aversion for both type 1 and type 2 households, and the risk aversion of the two types of households can be compared l 1 ; θ) . In other words, risk aversion is higher for less employable (type 2) households. These households face greater labor market frictions than those of type 1, so it is more difficult for them to insure themselves from asset fluctuations in the labor market, and they are correspondingly more risk averse. The quantitative importance of this effect is explored below.
Some examples of households that might fit the type 2, "less employable" classification are households nearing retirement age, households with less education, and households that suffer from discrimination in the labor market. According to the theory above, these households should be more risk averse than regular, type 1 households, and hold a smaller fraction of their wealth in risky assets such as stocks.
This result provides a formal justification for why households nearing retirement should hold a greater fraction of their wealth in bonds rather than stocks: they are more risk averse.
21 Of course, households near retirement also have a greater fraction of their wealth in financial assets rather than human capital, so retirees have a greater need to diversify their financial holdings in order to diversify their total wealth. Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992) solve a calibrated lifecycle portfolio allocation model numerically and find that labor market flexibility is an important factor in the household's willingness to hold risky assets. For tractability, their analysis considers only the extreme cases of perfectly flexible and perfectly rigid labor markets, essentially the same two cases considered in Swanson (2012) . The possibility that older households face greater labor market frictions than younger households is acknowledged by Bodie et al. (1992) as being potentially important, but is beyond the scope of their model. 22 The present paper shows how their analysis can be extended to the case of frictional labor markets, and provides some immediate insights into the nature and magnitude of these effects.
Empirical Evidence and Quantitative Implications
The theoretical predictions of the model discussed above are consistent with a number of empirical observations. First, there is substantial evidence that households vary their labor supply in response to financial shocks. For example, Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001) estimate that individuals who win a prize in the Massachusetts state lottery reduce their earnings by about 11 cents for every dollar won, and the effect on household earnings is potentially larger since spousal earnings are not included in their analysis. Coronado and Perozek (2003) find that individuals who held more stocks in the late 1990s retired on average about 7 months earlier than nonstockholders. And Coile and Levine (2009) find that older individuals are about 7 percent less likely to retire in a given year after the stock market falls 30 percent. More generally, the labor supply literature consistently estimates a significant effect of unearned income on hours worked (e.g., Pencavel, 1986) .
21 Gollier (2002) notes that younger households should have lower absolute risk aversion because they can distribute a given fall in wealth over more periods of consumption. That effect is not present in the infinite-horizon model of the present paper, although it is present in the numerical analysis of Bodie et al. (1992) . 22 For example, "The ability to vary labor supply ex post induces the individual to assume greater risks in his portfolio ex ante." (Bodie et al. 1992, p. 427) ; "Obviously, the opportunity to vary continuously one's labor supply without cost is a far cry from the workings of actual labor markets. A more realistic model would allow limited flexibility in varying labor and leisure." (ibid., p. 448); and "It is reasonable to hypothesize that, for most individuals, the degree of labor flexiliby diminishes over the life cycle. For this reason, the effective human capital on which the individual can draw also declines." (ibid., p. 446).
There is also substantial evidence that risk aversion varies over the business cycle. As mentioned above and in the Introduction, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) refer to numerous studies that find risk premia are higher in recessions, and Lettau and Ludvigson (2010) show that the Sharpe ratio for U.S. equities is strongly countercyclical. 23 A natural explanation for these findings is that investors' risk aversion itself is higher in recessions-indeed, one of the contributions of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) was to provide a model that generates countercyclical risk aversion. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013) analyze survey data for a large sample of Italian households before and during the 2008-09 recession, and show that these households' risk aversion is substantially higher during the recession. Interestingly, Guiso et al. (2013) show that this increase in risk aversion is independent of the household's portfolio performance during the 2008 financial crisis, so the increase in risk aversion appears to be related to factors other than wealth or habits in consumption.
The stylized model of the present paper is consistent with these qualitative empirical observations. The remainder of the section considers the international evidence and the more detailed quantitative predictions of the model. Table 2 reports international evidence on labor market flows and household portfolio allocations across risky and safe assets. Hobijn and Şahin (2007) estimate average values of s and f (θ) over time for a variety of OECD countries, and values for the six largest countries in their sample are reported in Table 2 . 24 In the present paper, individuals may be out of the labor force, employed, or unemployed, so s in Table 2 is defined to be the sum of the monthly flow rates from employment into unemployment and into nonemployment. The job-finding rate f (θ) is the monthly flow rate from unemployment into employment. A striking feature of these estimates is that the job-finding rate in Continental Europe is an order of magnitude lower than in the U.S., ranging from 1.3 to 3.5 percent as opposed to more than 28 percent in the U.S. By contrast, job separation rates are broadly similar across all the countries in the table.
International Comparison of Labor Flows and Household Portfolios
The last three columns of Table 2 provide some insight into household portfolio allocations between risky and safe assets in each country. Data on the percentage of households owning 23 See also Campbell (1999) , Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) , and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) . Table 2 as well (for which s = .019 and f (θ) is the same as in Hobijn and Şahin (2007) Labor market flows s and f (θ) are from Hobijn and Şahin (2007 , Table 4 ) and Shimer (2012) ; s is sum of monthly flow rates from employment (E) to unemployment (U) and to nonemployment (N); f (θ) is monthly flow from U to E. Percentages of households owning equities (directly and indirectly) and risky financial assets are from equities is from Guiso, Haliassos, and Japelli (2002) for the year 1998 and includes indirect holdings through mutual funds and retirement accounts as well as direct equity holdings. The theme in the last three columns of Table 2 is that households in the U.S. are more likely to hold stocks and allocate a greater fraction of their portfolios to riskier assets than households in the U.K. and Continental Europe. In fact, the difference between portfolio allocations in the U.S. and other countries in Table 2 are understatements because the U.K., German, and
Italian data overestimate the degree of indirect stockholding in those countries, as discussed in the previous footnote. As shown by , these differences in portfolio holdings are robust to controlling for demographic characteristics such as household wealth or age; that is, U.S. households of a given wealth level and age are more likely to hold equities or risky financial assets than are European households of a similar wealth level and age.
The international evidence in Table 2 is thus consistent with the theoretical points raised in the previous section: Labor markets in Europe are more frictional than those in the U.S., and households in Europe seem to be more risk averse in their portfolio allocations. There are, of 25 Data for France and Spain are not available in the survey. Data on indirect equity holdings for the U.K., Germany, and Italy are upper bounds because the portfolio surveys for those countries do not provide information on the type of mutual funds held, so that indirect stockholding in these countries cannot be separated from indirect holdings of other assets (Guiso et al., 2002, p. 7) .
course, other reasons why European households might be more reluctant than U.S. households to invest in stocks; for example, stock markets in Europe are generally less liquid and more volatile than in the U.S., intermediation fees for indirect stock holding are typically higher, and the costs of acquiring financial information may be higher in Europe (see, e.g., Guiso and Jappelli, 2002, p. 260) . However, the lower liquidity and higher intermediation costs in European equity and mutual fund markets are partly an equilibrium outcome of the lower level of household participation and activity in those markets. Thus, it is not clear that these other factors are fundamental causes of low equity market participation in Europe, as opposed to an endogenous response to European households' apparently higher risk aversion and preference for holding safer assets. The point of the present paper is that this apparently higher level of risk aversion may be due in part to the greater labor market rigidity that European households face.
Quantitative Implications of Labor Market Frictions for Risk Aversion
Labor market frictions can potentially have a large effect on risk aversion. 
As discussed in Swanson (2012) , the difference between these two expressions can be very large for reasonable parameterizations; this can also be seen in the first two rows of Table 3, which report values of s, f (θ), and risk aversion R c for these two extreme cases, as benchmarks. The ratio
is also reported, taking the monthly interest rate r to be 0.4 percent, as in Shimer (2010) ; this ratio lies between 0 and 1 and can be thought of as an index of labor market flexibility, with 0 corresponding to perfect rigidity and 1 to perfect flexibility. 27 The value of relative risk aversion R c from equation (38) for different values of the utility curvature parameters γ and χ is reported in the last four columns. When labor markets are perfectly rigid, R c = γ, while when labor markets are perfectly flexible, R c is smaller by a factor of between three and ten for the parameterizations considered in the table.
26 To be precise, risk aversion in the flexible-labor case is given by R c (a, l; θ) = (γ −1 + (wl/c)χ −1 ) −1 . To simplify the exposition in this paragraph, the approximation wl ≈ c is used. 27 The benchmark s = f (θ) = 1 yields a labor market flexibility index of .998, which is slightly less than 1. One cannot generate an index value higher than this without assuming a lower value for r or violating the constraint s + f (θ) < 2 that was used to solve equation (A17) forward. Relative risk aversion R c from equation (38) for different values of γ and χ, using estimated values of s and f (θ) from Hobijn and Şahin (2007) and Shimer (2012) . The monthly interest rate r is set to .004. See notes to Table 2 and text for details.
The middle rows of Table 3 focus on the case of labor market frictions that are intermediate between these two extremes, investigating how risk aversion varies over a range of empirically plausible values for s and f (θ), such as those in Table 2 . The values of s and f (θ) estimated by Hobijn and Şahin (2007) , and reported in Table 2 , are repeated in the first two columns.
For the U.S., the labor market flexibility index (s + f (θ))/ r + s + f (θ) = .987, almost as high as the perfect flexibility benchmark. The values for Europe are lower (taking the monthly interest rate r for each country to be 0.4 percent, the same as for the U.S.), but even Italy's labor market flexibility measures about 81 percent by this metric. According to this index, the labor market in every country in the table is much closer to perfect flexibility than perfect rigidity.
Mathematically, the job-finding rate f (θ) is much larger than the monthly interest rate r in every country, so the ratio (s + f (θ))/ r + s + f (θ) is close to unity. Intuitively, households in the model are sufficiently patient that the extra time it takes to vary household employment is not very costly; the household is able to insure itself from asset fluctuations almost as well as if labor markets were perfectly flexible.
This observation is reflected in the last four columns of Table 3 , which report the modelimplied coefficient of relative risk aversion R c across countries for different values of γ and χ.
Labor market frictions in Italy cause risk aversion to be about 10 to 20 percent higher than for the U.S., a remarkably small difference given the large difference in f (θ) across the two countries.
Households would either have to be much more impatient, or labor markets much more rigid, for risk aversion to be more substantially affected.
The results for cyclical variation in risk aversion are similar. The last two rows of Table 3 report values of s and f (θ) for the U.S. in expansions and recessions, as estimated by Shimer (2012) . 28 In recessions, the job separation rate increases slightly, while the job finding rate falls by almost half. Nevertheless, labor markets are so flexible in the U.S. that even the low value of f (θ) in recessions has very little effect on the flexibility index in the third column. The resulting differences in risk aversion R c in the last four columns are correspondingly small. Although risk aversion is higher in recessions in this calibration, households are sufficiently patient, and labor markets sufficiently flexible, that the extra time it takes to vary employment is not significantly costly.
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Quantitative Implications of More Costly Labor Market Frictions
The results in Table 2 suggest that countries with more frictional labor markets tend to be more risk averse. Similarly, there is much evidence that risk aversion is greater in recessions (Campbell and Cochrane 1999) . If the ratio (s + f (θ))/ r + s + f (θ) in Table 3 were lower, that would help bring the stylized model of the present paper closer to these empirical observations. Table 4 investigates the extent to which a higher household discount rate r (or, equivalently, lower discount factor β) would improve the model's performance. Intuitively, a higher discount rate makes the delays caused by labor market frictions more costly; in fact, in the extremely stylized model of the present paper, the only cost of labor market frictions is this adjustment delay. Thus, when bringing the model to the data, the interest rate r should also be viewed as a proxy for other costs of labor market frictions, such as the depreciation of human capital or stigmatization associated with longer unemployment spells. In this respect, higher calibrated values of r, as a cost parameter, are empirically plausible.
28 As for the international comparison in the middle rows of Table 3 , the job separation rate s is here taken to be the sum of the monthly flow rate from employment to unemployment and to nonemployment, while the job-finding rate f (θ) is the monthly flow rate from unemployment to employment. 29 Concrete evidence on labor market frictions faced by less employable households is less readily available, although a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the effects in the model for these households should also be small. If the steady-state unemployment rate is roughly twice as large for less employable households as for the representative household, and job separation rates are about the same, then the job-finding rate f (θ) would be roughly one-half or one-third as large as for the representative household (since l might also be lower). But even a fall in f (θ) by a factor of three has relatively little effect on (s + f (θ))/(r + s + f (θ)) or risk aversion R c . Relative risk aversion R c from equation (38) for different values of γ, χ, and r, using estimated values of s and f (θ) from Hobijn and Şahin (2007) and Shimer (2012) . A higher discount rate in the model may proxy for other costs of labor market frictions, such as human capital depreciation. See notes to Table 3 and text for details.
The first two rows of Table 4 repeat the computations from Table 3 for the baseline case of r = 0.4 percent per month, focusing on the U.S. and Italy, which represented the two empirical extremes in Table 3 . The bottom four rows of Table 4 consider higher values for r, 0.8 and 1.2 percent per month.
The higher discount rates in Table 4 greatly improve the model's ability to generate differences in risk aversion across countries. For example, when r = .012, Italy's labor market flexibility index falls below 59 percent and its risk aversion rises about 30 to 50 percent relative to the U.S.
Changes in risk aversion of this magnitude seem much more consistent with the cross-country differences in portfolio allocation in Table 2 . When r = .008, the implied risk aversion in Italy is about 20 to 35 percent higher than in the U.S.
Despite the improved success at generating cross-country variation in risk aversion, however, the discount rates in Table 4 are not high enough to generate significant business-cycle variation in U.S. risk aversion. Labor market flows in the U.S. are simply too large to make delay very costly for households, even in recessions. With r = 1.2 percent per month and using Shimer's (2012) labor market flows estimates from Table 3 , risk aversion in the model only varies by about 1 to 2 percent over the business cycle (not shown).
Of course, the importance of labor market frictions for business cycle variation in other countries could be larger; for example, if the job-finding rate in Italy were to fall by half in recessions-say from .016 to .008-the implied change in risk aversion would be about 10 to 20 percent over the business cycle (not shown), much greater than in the U.S. More data on the cyclicality of job separation and finding rates in other countries would be needed to obtain better estimates of the importance of this effect.
Conclusions
Traditional studies of risk aversion, such as Arrow (1964) , Pratt (1965) , Epstein and Zin (1989), and Weil (1989) , assume that household labor supply is fixed. However, this assumption ignores households' ability to partially offset shocks to their portfolios by varying hours of work. As a result, fixed-labor measures of risk aversion are not representative of the household's aversion to holding risky assets when labor supply can vary. For reasonable parameterizations, traditional, fixed-labor measures of risk aversion can overstate the household's actual aversion to holding a risky asset by a factor of as much as ten, as in Table 3 .
The closed-form expressions for risk aversion derived in the present paper lie between the fixed-and flexible-labor expressions derived in Swanson (2012) . These formulas imply that risk aversion should be higher: 1) in recessions, 2) in countries with more frictional labor markets, such as Continental Europe, and 3) for households that are less employable, such as retirees, lesseducated households, and households facing labor market discrimination. In all of these cases, it is more difficult for the household to vary its employment to insure itself from asset fluctuations.
Traditional, fixed-labor measures of risk aversion are essentially unrelated to the equity premium in a standard real business cycle model with labor market search, while relative risk aversion R c , derived in the present paper, matches the equity premium closely. Thus, measuring risk aversion correctly-taking into account the household's labor margin-is necessary for it to correspond to risk premia in the model.
There is a wide variety of empirical support for the model's qualitative predictions. In particular, numerous authors have found that risk premia are higher in recessions (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) , that Continental European households are more conservative in their portfolio allocations (e.g., , and that older households invest more conservatively (e.g., . The present paper demonstates the potential connection between these empirical facts and the labor market.
Quantitatively, the stylized model of the present paper requires a high discount rate-about 10 to 15 percent per year-for the effects of labor market frictions on risk aversion to be important.
Intuitively, search frictions only delay, and do not prevent, households' labor adjustment, and the cost of this delayed adjustment is closely related to the discount rate. Other costs of delayed labor adjustment, such as liquidity constraints or borrowing constraints, would have to be incorporated into the model to make it consistent with both a low household discount rate and substantial variation in risk aversion over time or across countries. Alternatively, a high household discount rate could be justified using generalized recursive preferences, as in Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) , which cause households to discount future bad states of the world more heavily and would make delayed labor adjustment in bad states of the world more costly. Since many studies find Epstein-Zin preferences help macroeconomic models explain a variety of asset pricing puzzles (see, e.g., several of the studies cited in footnote 1), this would seem to be a promising avenue for future research.
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions and Technical Details
Microfoundation for Household Preferences
The household consists of a continuum of individuals, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. At each time t, each individual either works, searches for a job, or engages in home production of nonmarket goods and services, including "leisure". Let l t denote the measure of household members who work in period t, u t the measure of household members who search, and h t = 1− l t − u t the measure of household members who engage in home production. The household's output of nonmarket goods and services, c n t , is given by
where H is an increasing, concave function of the measure of household members engaged in home production. Each individual household member has a period utility function given by
where c m it and c n it denotes individual i's consumption at time t of market and nonmarket goods, respesctively, and u and v are increasing, strictly concave, and twice-differentiable functions. For simplicity, it is assumed that the disutility of working, searching, and home production are equal and enter additively into (A2). Since the disutility of work then equals a constant for each individual in each period t, that constant can be normalized to zero.
Household members pool their income and consumption of home-produced goods, so that each member consumes the same amount of market and nonmarket goods in each period t. Let c t and c n t denote this common level of market and nonmarket good consumption, respectively. The household's utility flow in each period t is given by the integral of its individual members' utility flows, which equals
since each individual's consumption of market and nonmarket goods is the same. Let U (c t ) ≡ u(c t ) and
. Then the household's period utility function is given by
where U is increasing, strictly concave, and twice-differentiable, and V is increasing, strictly convex, and twice-differentiable, where the properties of V follow from those of v and H. This motivates the preference specification (1).
Proof of Proposition 1
Since (a t , l t ; θ t ) is an interior point of X, V(a t + 
For a sufficiently small fee μ in (8), the change in household welfare (6) is given to first order by
Using the envelope theroem, we can rewrite (A5) as
where a *
Turning now to the gamble in (7), note that the household's optimal choices for consumption and unemployment in period t, c the household may undertake precautionary saving when faced with this gamble. Thus, in this section we
Finally, ε t+1 is independent of θ t+1 , l * t+1 , and a * t+1 , evaluating the latter two at σ = 0. Since ε t+1 has unit variance, (A10) reduces to
Equating ( 
To evaluate (A12) at the nonstochastic steady state, set a t+1 = a, l t+1 = l, and θ t+1 = θ to get − V 11 (a, l; θ) V 1 (a, l; θ) .
Note that if w, r, d, and f (θ) do not change, as in the Arrow-Pratt gamble for a single household in Section 3, then equation (A27) reduces to (25), where dl t = 0 in that example because labor at time t is given. More generally, (A27) includes the effects of changes in w, r, d, and f (θ) on consumption. The term in square brackets in (A27) describes the change in household wealth-including nonfinancial wealth-and thus the first line of (A27) describes the wealth effect on consumption. The last line of (A27) describes the substitution effect: changes in consumption due to changes in current and future wages and interest rates. The ratio w r+s+f (θ) corresponds to the present discounted value of wages from an increase in labor at time t, over the lifetime of the job. The term udf t+k , which represents the change in the number of jobs found each period, is multiplied by the same present value.
Let dÂ t+1 denote the quantity inside the square brackets in (A27), representing the change in household wealth, and let dΦ t+1 ≡ E t+1
dω t+k ), the intertemporal substitution term from (A27). Then the stochastic discount factor and risk premium can be written as follows:
Proposition A1. To first order, evaluated at steady state,
To second order, evaluated at steady state,
Proof: Note first that R a (a, l; θ) = γ c r 1 + wλϕ . Substituting (A19) into (A18) yields (A28). Substituting (A28) into (A17) yields (A29). Finally, Cov(dx, dy) is accurate to second order when dx and dy are accurate to first order. Equation (A29) characterizes the relationship between risk aversion and the risk premium on the asset. The first term in (A29) shows that ψ i t increases locally linearly with R a , by an amount that depends on the covariance between the asset return and the household's wealth, including nonfinancial wealth. This link between risk premia and risk aversion should not be too surprising: Propositions 1-2 described the risk premium for extremely simple, idiosyncratic gambles over household wealth, while Proposition A1 shows that the same coefficient also appears in the household's aversion to more general financial market gambles that may be correlated with aggregate variables such as interest rates, wages, and transfers.
The second term in (A29) corresponds to Merton's (1973) "changes in investment opportunities" in the ICAPM framework. Even if R a = 0-that is, even if households are risk-neutral in a cross-sectional or CAPM sense-ψ i t can be nonzero. This is because even a risk-neutral household can benefit from an asset that pays off well when the price of the household's total consumption bundle is low. An asset that pays off well when current and future wages are low (and hence leisure is cheap) or current and future interest rates are high (and hence future consumption is cheap) is preferable to an asset that pays off poorly in those situations. Even a risk-neutral household would be willing to pay a premium for such an asset-implying a lower ψ i t -and this effect is captured by the second term in (A29). The fact that households in the present paper face a consumption-leisure tradeoff as well as a currentvs.-future consumption tradeoff implies that the second term in (A29) is more general than just changes in the household's investment opportunities. Indeed, the second term in (A29) is better described as being due to "changes in purchasing opportunities." The decomposition in (A29) also suggests that ψ i t is more accurately described as an "expected excess return" rather than a "risk premium" because only the first term in (A29) represents compensation to the household for bearing risk; the second term is not compensation for risk but rather reflects changes in the household's purchasing opportunities over time.
Finally, the decomposition (A29) can be written in terms of relative rather than absolute risk aversion using Definition 2:
so that (A38) corresponds to a standard intratemporal optimality condition between l + u and c, and dω τ represents the change in the present discounted value of the gains from searching for a job, analogous to dw τ in a frictionless model. Differentiating the transition equation (2) 
Solving backward to time t gives
(1−s−f (θ))
Substituting (A38) into (A40) and taking expectations gives
Inserting (A41) 
Expressions for Risk Aversion with Balanced Growth
The results in the main text carry through essentially unchanged to the case of balanced growth. The corresponding expressions are collected and proved here in Lemma A2, Proposition A2, and Corollary A2. Along a balanced growth path, x ∈ {l, r, u} satisfies x t+k = x t for k = 1, 2, . . ., and we drop the time subscript to denote the constant value. For x ∈ {a, c, w, d}, we have x t+k = G k x t for k = 1, 2, . . .,
